We assess the Carbon-Kuznets-Curve hypothesis using internationally consistent and comparable production-based versus consumption-based CO 2 emissions data for 40 countries (and 35 industries) during 1995-2007 from the World Input Output Database (WIOD). The estimates for per capita CO 2 emissions are truly comprehensive as these include all carbon emissions embodied in international trade and global commodity chains. Even if we find evidence suggesting a decoupling of production-based CO 2 emissions and growth, consumptionbased CO 2 emissions are monotonically increasing with per capita GDP. We draw out the implications of these findings for climate policy and binding emission reduction obligations.
Introduction
Most scientists consider it extremely likely that the Earth's climate will become warmer if atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) continue to increase because of emissions by human (economic) activity. 1 In its fifth assessment report, the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC 2014) predicts that in a business-as-usual scenario the mean global surface temperature will increase by 4 o C or more above pre-industrial levels by the end of 21 st century (Collins et al. 2013 )-with a non-negligible risk of far higher dangerous warming (Wagner and Weitzman 2015) . To avoid the risk of dangerous and irreversible climate change, the consensus view is that the global average temperature should not rise above pre-industrial temperatures by more than 2 o C (Edenhofer et al. 2013) . This consensus view which has recently been endorsed by 195 nations at the 21 st session of the Conference of Parties (COP21) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) in Paris in December 2015, implies that anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have to be reduced by 41 to 72 percent in 2050 compared to emissions levels in 2010, and by as much as 78 to 118 percent in 2100 (IPCC 2014; COP21). These major emission reductions over the coming decades will need a dramatic decarbonization of our energy systems as well as a historically unprecedented ramping up of energy efficiency, the more so the higher is the rate of global economic growth (Grubb 2014, p. 14) . This points to a major global challenge: is it possible to decarbonize and halve emissions by mid-century so as to keep below the 2°C limit while maintaining global economic growth (Martinez Alier 2009 Grubb 2014; Spash 2015) ?
The issue of whether economic growth can be delinked from GHG emissions is usually framed in terms of the Carbon Kuznets Curve (CKC)-the inverted U-shaped relationship between per capita income and GHG emissions per capita (Dinda 2004; Müller-Fürstenberger & Wagner 2007; Kaika & Zervas, 2013a , 2013b . The CKC hypothesis holds that GHG emissions per person do initially increase with rising per capita income (due to industrialization), then peak and decline after a threshold level of per capita GDP, as countries become more energy efficient, more technologically sophisticated and more inclined to and able to reduce emissions by corresponding legislation. The large empirical and methodological literature on the CKC does Ribes et al. (2016) provide a novel corroboration of the IPCC's (2014) conclusion that it "is extremely likely [95 percent confidence] more than half of the observed increase in global average surface temperature from 1951 to 2010 was caused by the anthropogenic increase in greenhouse gas concentrations and other anthropogenic forcings together …" not provide unambiguous and robust evidence of a CKC peaking for carbon dioxide (see Kaika & Zervas (2013a , 2013b for a recent review), if only because of well documented but yet unresolved econometric problems concerning the appropriateness of model specification and estimation strategies (Wagner 2008 ).
We will leave these econometric issues aside however and instead focus on the fact that the overwhelming majority of empirical CKC studies use domestic production-based CO 2 emissions data to test the Kuznets hypothesis-and hence overlook the emissions embodied in international trade and in global commodity chains. Based on IPCC (2007) guidelines, GHG emissions are counted as the national emissions coming from domestic production. This geographical definition hides the GHG emissions embodied in international trade and obscures the empirical fact that domestic production-based GHG emissions in (for example) the EU have come down, but consumption-based emissions associated with EU standards of livings have actually increased (Peters and Hertwich 2008; Boitier 2012) . Rich countries including the EU-27 and the U.S.A. with high average consumption levels are known to be net carbon importers as the CO 2 emissions embodied in their exports are lower than the emissions embodied in their imports (Nakano et al. 2009; Boitier 2012; Agrawala et al. 2014) . Vice versa, most developing (and industrializing) countries are net carbon exporters. What this implies is that, because of cross-border carbon leakages, consumption-based CO 2 emissions are higher than productionbased emissions in the OECD countries, but lower in the developing countries (Aichele & Felbermayr 2012) . This indicates that while there may well be a Kuznets-like delinking between economic growth and per capita production-based GHG emissions, it is as yet unclear whether such delinking is also occurring in terms of consumption-based GHG emissions. If not, the notion of "carbon decoupling" has to be rethought-in terms of a delinking between growth and consumption-based GHG emissions. After all, it is no great achievement to reduce domestic per capita carbon emissions by outsourcing carbon-intensive activities to other countries and by being a net importer of GHG, while raising consumption and living standards. This also does not constitute a viable global strategy of meeting the GHG emission reduction obligations implied by COP21. Hence, this paper assesses the CKC hypothesis using internationally comparable and consistent production-based versus consumption-based CO 2 emissions data for 40 countries (and 35 industries) for 1995-2007 from the World Input Output Database (WIOD). We argue that the notion of a decoupling of economic growth and carbon emissions is meaningful (for climate change mitigation) only when we define it in terms of consumption-based CO 2 emissions (and not production-based emissions). The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the CKC. Section 3 provides salient features of the WIOD data used and outlines the Fixed Effects Model used in the regression analysis. Section 4 compares the estimation results of the production-based and the consumption-based CKC. Section 5 draws out the policy implications and concludes.
The CKC: a review of the empirical literature
The Carbon Kuznets Curve (CKC) hypothesis postulates an inverted U-shaped relationship between CO 2 emissions and per capita income (as is shown in Figure 1 ): emissions per person increase up to a certain threshold level as per capita income goes up, after which they start to decrease (Dinda 2004; Müller-Fürstenberger & Wagner 2007; Kaika & Zervas, 2013a , 2013b .
Typically, most of the CKC studies use the following general reduced-form model in which GHG emissions per person is a polynomial cubic function (of degree three) of per capita income:
(1) y it = α i + β 1 x it + β 2 x 2 it + β 3 x 3 it + β 4 z it + e it where i = 1, ....., n countries, and t = 1, ….., T years. We note that equation (1) is a reducedform equation (Kaika & Zervas, 2013a) . Most studies do not explicitly specify the underlying structural equations of the system that lead to (1). The structural causes underlying the CKC have been widely debated however. While a detailed review of this literature is beyond the scope of our paper, the debate on the driving forces of the CKC pattern has focused on changes in income distribution during the process of per capita income growth (Torras and Boyce 1998; Scruggs 1998; Magnani 2000; Gangadhran & Valenzuela 2001; Bimonte 2002) , the income elasticity of demand for environmental quality (Dinda 2004; Kaika & Zervas 2013a) , structural and technological change from a specialization in primary activities to secondary activities and further to the more environmentally friendly tertiary sector (de Bruyn, van den Bergh & Opschoor 1998; Dinda 2004) , the diffusion of more carbon efficient technology through international trade and FDI (Muradian & Martinez-Alier 2001; Stavins et al. 2014) , and changes in institutions and governance during the process of economic development (Dasgupta, Laplante, Wang & Wheeler 2002; Dutt 2009 ). However, most of the empirical evidence depends only on the reduced-form equation (1) and not on the underlying (larger) structural model (Dinda 2004) . 
The (mechanistic) assumption underlying the CKC curve is that developing countries (which have low per capita incomes and are usually found on the rising slope of the curve) will follow the same development trajectory as the one followed by the developed countries (which feature higher per capita GDP and are found on the downward-sloping side of the curve). It is possible of course that due to some new technological breakthrough developing countries may be able to leapfrog to higher levels of per capita income (Grossman & Krueger 1995) . At the same time, however, in our finite world, the poor countries of today will be unable to find further countries from which to import carbon-intensive products as they themselves grow richer. Thus these countries would face the difficult task of abating pollution activities rather than outsourcing them to other countries (Arrow et al. 1995; Stern et al. 1996) . Therefore, today's developing (and industrializing) countries may not be able to follow in the steps of the developed countries.
There is a voluminous econometric literature estimating the CKC equation (1) What all the studies reported in Table 2 share in common (and perhaps surprisingly so) is that they rely on (domestic) production-based emissions data to test the CKC hypothesis. Doing so has two drawbacks. The first drawback of using production-based emission data is that it ignores non-trivial emissions associated with international transportation and international trade (Peters & Hertwich, 2008) . CO 2 Emissions from the production of traded goods and services have increased from 4.3 GtCO 2 in 1990 (20% of global CO 2 emissions) to 7.8 GtCO 2 in 2008 (26% of global CO 2 emissions) (see Peters, Minx, Weber & Edenhofer, 2011) . This shows that international trade cannot be ignored while determining the underlying driving forces behind global, regional and national emissions. However, attributing emissions from international transportation to countries is controversial and as of now there is no transparent and agreed-upon method to allocate these emissions to (trading) countries (Peters et al. 2011; Boitier 2012) . Schmalensee et al. (1998 ), De Bruyn et al. (1998 , Agras & Chapman (1999) , Galeotti & Lanza (1999) , Borghesi (2000) , Perrings & Ansuategi (2000) , Panayotou et al.(2000) , Pauli (2003) and Aldy (2005) .! (Kaika & Zervas, 2013a) The second drawback of using production-based CO 2 emissions is that this ignores the fact that the reduction in per capita carbon emissions in (especially) the rich countries committed to the Kyoto Protocol (the so-called Annex I Parties) has been (at least partly) offset by an increase in emissions in the (industrializing and exporting) developing countries which are not committed to any binding emission targets (the non-Annex I Parties), as has been shown by Aichele & Felbermayr (2012) and Blanco et al. (2014) . Specifically, due to the dramatic internationalization of trade in global production chains, the Annex I countries have been able to reduce their national production-based carbon emissions by importing carbon-intensive industrial products from abroad. Hence, for most countries production-based and consumption-based emissions are found to differ considerably (for evidence, see Peters 2008; Davis & Caldeira 2010; Ahmad & Wyckoff 2003; Peters, Minx, Weber & Edenhofer 2011) . We define how we measure production-based and consumption-based GHG emissions below, but we can already observe here that net carbon imports (and exports) have grown substantially in recent years. To illustrate, in 1990, the territorial production-based emissions of the Annex I Parties to the Kyoto Protocol amounted to 14.2 GtCO 2 ; their consumption-based emissions were higher (14.6 GtCO 2 ) which implies these rich countries had a carbon import surplus of 0.4 GtCO 2 (or 2.8% of their production-based emissions). In 2008, production-based emissions of the Annex I Parties had declined to 13.9 GtCO 2 , but their consumption-based emissions had increased to 15.5 GtCO 2 ; net carbon imports amounted to 1.6 GtCO 2 (or 11.5% of production-based emissions). Trends were the reverse in the non-Annex I Parties which are net carbon exporters. Their production-based emissions increased from 7.7 GtCO 2 in 1990 to 16.4 GtCO 2 in 2008, while their consumptionbased emissions rose from 7.3 GtCO 2 to 14.8 GtCO 2 over the same period. In 2008, the nonAnnex I countries were exporting about 10% of their production-based emissions to the Annex I countries (Peters et al. 2011) . In general, the increasing carbon-import surplus in the OECD countries has been made possible by an increasing carbon-export surplus in developing countries (Boitier 2012; Agrawala et al. 2014; Nakano et al. 2009 ). In light of the above, it is vitally important to statistically test for any decoupling between CO 2 emissions and economic growth using both consumption-based and production-based emission data.
Data and Econometric Model
The data on production-based and consumption-based CO 2 emissions by country are from the World Input Output Database (WIOD), which provides consistent annualized inter-country input-output accounts covering the period 1995-2009 for 40 countries (27 EU member states and 13 non-European countries). The WIOD data are broken down across 36 different sectors (35 industries and one household sector) and 26 energy commodities plus one entry for non-energy related CO 2 emissions to complete the emission matrix (see Timmer et al. 2015) . For the countries covered, the database uses economic linkages between industries, which are portrayed by a set of harmonized supply and use tables (SUTs), together with data on international trade in goods and services to integrate them into sets of inter-country input output tables (IOTs). These input output tables are then used to develop environmental accounts including for GHG emissions. The main source of information for WIOD's energy accounts is the energy balances from the IEA (2011a), which have been made compatible with WIOD's inter-country inputoutput tables (see Timmer et al. 2015 for details) The WIOD data notably do account for emissions arising from international aviation, fishing vessels and marine bunkers. The WIOD database uses standard production-based CO 2 emission factors provided by the IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories (IPCC, 2014a), complemented by country-specific production-based emission factors provided in national CO 2 emission reports by the UNFCCC. 
where H E are national emissions directly originating from households' consumption. We must emphasize that E prod is a truly comprehensive measure of production-based GHG emissions, because it includes all direct and indirect emissions associated with the production and export of countries in this hypothetical global production chain (Timmer et al. 2015) .
In Figure 2 appears the difference (
for 5 aggregated regions: the EU-27, the USA, the OECD countries, the BRICs, and the rest of In the left-hand panel appear production-based CO 2 emissions (calculated using equation (5)) and the data points visually suggest a non-linear (inverted U-shaped) association between emissions and GDP per person (which is suggestive of decoupling). In contrast, in the right-hand panel in which we have plotted consumption-based CO 2 emissions (based on equation (6)), the correlation appears to be a linear one. The nature and the statistical significance of the relationship between emissions and income per capita will be tested in the next section. Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics of our data panel. It can be seen that the distribution of GDP per capita is skewed towards the right, as median income ($25,885) is lower than average income per capita ($26,357); we observe that 95% of the countries in the sample have per capita income lower than $45,983. We note that the mean level of production-based and consumption-based CO 2 emissions for the world as a whole must be identical (because global production-and consumption-based emissions must be equal after all); in our sample of 39 countries, however, average per capita consumption-based emissions exceed average production-based carbon emissions per person. We used linear, quadratic as well as cubic functional forms to study the relationship between growth and (per capita) emissions to see which specification better explains the variance in CO 2 emissions (Galeotti and Lanza 1999) . Our prime objective is to observe the relationship between income per capita and CO 2 emissions per person, while controlling for the unobserved heterogeneity across countries and for time-specific effects. We rejected the Pooled Ordinary 
With-in variance measures the variation with in one country over time.
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The panel is sub-divided into Annex I and non-Annex I countries. Annex I countries are developed countries which are less vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, whereas non-Annex I countries are mostly developing countries which are more vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change and also rely more heavily on fossil fuel production and commerce. The estimation results for each of these groups separately are available upon request from the authors.!! all the coefficients are found to be statistically significantly different from zero and they also have the expected sign; the value of R 2 of 0.39 indicates that GDP is a major explanatory factor in determining production-based CO 2 emissions. In the third case of the cubic functional form, β 3 is found to be zero and the other coefficients (β 1 and β 2 ) are statistically insignificant. Hence, the quadratic functional form provides the best fit for the relation between production-based CO 2 emissions per capita and GDP per capita, which suggests an inverted-U shaped pattern.
Estimation Results
Using Equation (2), we can calculate the threshold level of income at which productionbased carbon emissions start to decouple from per capita income growth at $36,148 (see Figure 4 for an illustration). This turning point lies within the sample range of GDP (see Table 4 ), but it is well above the sample average (of $26,356 in Table 3 ). This indicates that overall productionbased emissions will continue to increase until the sample average per capita income has reached the threshold.
! ! 
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Figure 4 Relation between Production-based CO 2 Emissions per Capita and GDP per Capita
Note: based on results for the quadratic functional form reported in Table 4 . Table 5 presents the estimated results using consumption-based CO 2 emissions per person. Unlike in our regressions using production-based emissions, we now find in the linear model that real GDP per capita has a statistically significant impact (at less than 5%) on per capita consumption-based emissions. The value of R 2 for the linear model is high (0.51), which
shows that GDP per capita is a major factor in determining consumption-based CO 2 emissions indeed. However, we also find that the coefficients of the quadratic functional form are statistically significant (and having the expected sign), while coefficient β 3 is found to be zero in the case of the cubic functional form (as in Table 5 ). The results for the quadratic functional form suggest that there is an inverted U-shaped CKC, as is illustrated in Figure 5 . When we calculate the threshold level of per capita income (using equation (2)), we obtain a high level of real income per person of $113,709. This level of income is outside the per capita income range of the whole sample (as maximum GDP per capita in the sample is $96,246; see Table 3 ). This implies that statistically (i.e. within the sample range) the relationship between per capita income and per capita carbon emissions is monotonically increasing and the consumption-related CO 2 emissions per capita do not decouple from economic growth within sample range. Even if we would entertain the possibility that there will be a decoupling of growth and emissions at the very high per-capita income level of $113,709 (as suggested by our findings), it should be immediately clear that waiting for this to happen is both unrealistic and extremely risky. By the time average income reaches that turning point, the world will have crossed major climate thresholds and global warming would have become unstoppable and its consequences irreversible and catastrophic (Wagner and Weitzman 2015) . We cannot therefore reject the hypothesis that there is a monotonically increasing relationship between per capita income and per person consumption-based carbon emissions. Table 6 summarizes and compares our econometric findings for production-based and consumption-based carbon emissions per capita. Table 5 . The predicted turning point for production-based GHG emissions has to be seen in the context of the intentions expressed at the COP21 in Paris to keep global warming below 2 o C by the end of this century with an estimated likelihood greater than 66% (Rogelj. et al. 2012; Baer et al. 2013) . This means (as we noted above) that global annual CO 2 emissions need to be reduced by at least 50% by 2050 (Rogelj et al. 2011; Rogelj et al. 2012 ) and cumulative greenhouse gas emissions up to 2050 have to be kept within the global "carbon budget"-the total allowable carbon emissions for a >66% chance to keep global average temperature below Using the estimated production-based CKC of Table 4 , continuous per capita income growth of 0.8% per annum raises the level of per capita CO 2 emissions to 7.2 tCO 2 per capita in 2050 (see Table 7 ). We assume (following official U.N. estimates) that world population increases from 7 billion in 2012 to 9.7 billion in 2050. This in turn would imply that global GHG emissions in 2050 are 70.3 GtCO 2 e, which is 40% higher than the actual level of emissions in 2012 (of ! !
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50GtCO 2 e) and roughly 80% above the level needed (of 25GtCO 2 e) to have a 66% probability of meeting the 2°C target of COP21. Annual emissions hence continue to increase before decoupling starts and this means the atmospheric concentration of CO 2 will continue to inexorably rise as well. The cumulative 2012-2050 increase in the atmospheric stock of carbon amounts to 2317GtCO 2 e, which exceeds the global carbon budget for 2012-2050 by more than 74% and-importantly-more than exhausts the total 2°C global carbon budget up to 2100 (Table 7 ). This scenario with global emissions increasing to 70.3GtCO 2 e roughly corresponds to one of the emission pathways developed by Rogelj et al. (2011) , in which carbon emissions exceed 70GtCO 2 e in 2050 and peak only around 2080, and which results (with a likely probability > 66%) in a global mean temperature increase of 3.5 o C by 2100; significantly, along this pathway, the probability of attaining the 2°C warming target would be much less than 33% (Baer et al. 2013) .
While this particular pathway is evidently inconsistent with the aim of COP21, it is
clearly not the only conceivable scenario. However, further slowing down per capita real GDP growth (below the rate of 0.8% per year assumed here) will postpone reaching the CKC turning point and hence not help to bring down per capita carbon emissions in time. It is true that significantly speeding up per capita income growth so as to reach the CKC turning point much earlier than in 2050 (say, already in 2025) will help to reduce additional cumulative emissions (mainly because of a still smaller global population), but this scenario is economically unrealistic and still incompatible with the 2°C global warming target. 5 Accordingly, the emission gap between the pathway needed to stay below 2 o C warming (i.e. annual global emissions of 25GtCO 2 e by 2050) and the projected CKC pathway in Table 7 is an unambiguous signal that waiting for the production-based CKC turning point conflicts with the ambitions of COP21-and the "grow and wait for the turning point" pathway is a sure recipe for climate disaster.
If we assume global per capita real income growth to equal 2.5% per year (which we deem unlikely), the CKC turning point will be reached in 2025. Per person carbon emissions will peak at 7.2 tCO 2 e and then decline. With a global population of 7.9 billion people in 2025, global emissions will be 56.9GtCO 2 e (14% higher than in 2012) and the global 2 o C carbon budget will have gone down by more than half (745GtCO 2 e). With continued global population and a remaining carbon budget for 2025-2050 of only 585GtCO 2 e, there has to be a historically unprecedented decoupling between economic growth and emissions to give humanity a fair chance to keep warming below 2 o C. 
Conclusions and Policy Implications
We estimated the relationship between CO 2 emissions and economic growth using input-outputbased production-and consumption-related CO 2 emission inventories from WIOD's environmental accounts for 39 different countries for a period of 13 years (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) . Our CO 2 emissions data include emissions embodied in international trade and along internationally fragmented commodity chains-and hence represent the most comprehensive accounting of both production-and consumption-based GHG emissions to date. While there is econometric evidence in support of a CKC pattern for production-based CO 2 emissions, the estimated percapita income turning point implies a level of annual global GHG emissions of 70.3GtCO 2 e, ! ! 24! ! which is 40% higher than the 2012 level and not compatible with the COP21 emissions reduction pathway consistent with keeping global warming below 2 o C. The production-based inverted Ushaped CKC is, in other words, not a relevant framework for climate change mitigation. In addition, we do not find any support for a decoupling between living standards and per capita consumption levels on the one hand and GHG emissions per person on the other hand. This means that the Annex-I countries (which are mostly the rich OECD countries) have managed to some extent to delink their production systems from GHG emissions by relocating and outsourcing carbon-intensive production activities to the non-Annex I countries-as is indicated in the growing carbon-import surplus of the former and the growing carbon-export surplus of the latter group of countries (Figure 2 ). The generally used production-based GHG emissions data ignore the highly fragmented nature of global production chains (and networks) and are unable to reveal the ultimate driver of increasing CO 2 emissions: consumption growth (or "affluenza") in the rich economies. What appears (at first sight) to be the result of structural change in the economy is in reality just a relocation of carbon-intensive production to other regions-or carbon leakage. In terms of consumption patterns, we find no noticeable structural change as (direct and indirect) consumption-based GHG emissions continue to rise with higher per capita GDP.
These results should be sobering as they strongly indicate that there is no such thing as an automatic decoupling between economic growth and GHG emissions. It means we have to give up on the notion of the CKC (see also Storm 2009; Lohmann 2009 ). To keep warming below 2 o C de-carbonization has to be drastic and it has to be organized by deliberate (policy) interventions and conscious change in consumption and production patterns. Grubb (2014) , Mazzucato and Perez (2014) and the Global Apollo Programme (2014) formulate potentially feasible innovation agendas to bring about the needed transformative change, away from fossil fuels and toward renewable energy systems, which all rely on some form of "entrepreneurial state intervention".
The rich Annex-I countries which are in the forefront of technological innovation, are in the position to take the lead and also encourage the developing non-Annex-I countries to participate by investing heavily in the development of new energy technologies that are clean, efficient, and are also affordable for the developing countries. Without such change, the business-as-usual scenario looks bleak, as GHG emissions will continue to increase with economic growth and world population growth ( Figure 5 ) and there is hardly any time or global carbon budget left.
Recent projections, based on new modeling using long-term average projections of economic that we may be much closer than we realized to breaching the 2 o C limit and have already used up all of our room for maneuver (see Pfeiffer et al. 2016 for a similar warning). This carries considerable risk, as warming becomes self-reinforcing and dangerous beyond the 2 o C limit, and
it is the precise outcome COP21 wishes to avoid-but quite in line with our findings.
There is therefore no escape from deep reforms of the global economy which speed up the process of de-carbonization (Grubb 2014) countries is a source of some hope. However, to make the agreement work, global action to reduce GHG emissions and to share the burden of adjusting to a low-or zero-carbon economy should be fair (Baer et al. 2009 ) and ideally be based on an assessment of capacity (a country's ability to pay) and historical responsibility (a country's cumulative contribution to the problem of excess GHG concentrations in the atmosphere). As a starting point, this requires comprehensively accounting for the total (direct and indirect) carbon pollution over global commodity chains as a whole and distinguishing between a country's production-based and consumption-based CO 2 emissions to enable the working out of a "fair" sharing of the responsibility between the various actors operating in the global commodity chain (on this, see Rodriguez et al. 2006; Lenzen et al. 2007; Marques et al. 2008; Andrew and Forgie 2008) . Our analysis must hence not just be read as a falsification of the Carbon Kuznets Hypothesis (which we think is important in and of itself), but more broadly as pointing out the urgent need to come to a global agreement on shared producer and consumer responsibility on CO 2 emissions (see Lenzen et al. 2007; Grubb 2014) .
